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Abstract 
 
Reliable benchmarking is essential for effective 
management of the government digitalization efforts. 
Existing benchmarking instruments generally fail to 
support this target. One problem is the diversity of 
instruments, resulting in a split image of digital 
progress and adding ambiguity to policy decisions. 
Another problem is disconnect in assessing progress 
between digital and traditional “analog” 
governance, lending support to a dangerous idea that 
countries can compensate for lack of progress in 
their governance systems by simply digitalizing them. 
This paper provides a path to addressing both 
problems by: aggregating relevant indicators of the 
World Economic Forum’s Network Readiness Index 
(NRI) to obtain a single synthetic measure of digital 
government, balancing this measure with progress in 
analog governance using World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), calculating new 
measures for the latest editions of NRI and WGI, and 
discussing results. Technically, the paper applies 
multidimensional linear ordering and factor analysis.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
When treating digital government as a deliberate, 
perceptible, designable and measurable arrangement 
of tools, decisions and actions, there is a rudimentary 
need for data-based benchmarking that is able to 
capture and compare digital government performance 
among countries, states, cities and other entities. 
Established instruments such as the NRI or the 
United Nations’ e-Government Development Index 
serve different goals, implement different models and 
target different users. However, those who rely on 
such instruments to perform consequential decisions, 
i.e. policymakers and public managers responsible 
for overseeing the construction of digital government, 
encounter at least two issues here: 1) the diversity of 
benchmarks makes the image of digital government 
progress split and ambiguous, and thus difficult to 
translate to concrete policy decisions; and 2) the 
“digital” measures do not say much about the impact 
of digitalization on traditional “analog” governance, 
thus lending support to a dangerous idea that 
countries can compensate lack progress in their 
governance systems by simply digitalizing them.  
This situation is confusing for policy makers who 
introduce relevant policies; for public managers who 
implement such policies; for citizens who need a 
clear picture of how digitalization will change their 
interactions with authorities; and for businesses that 
need assurances of good governance and the rule of 
law. Such expectations may be compromised by 
nefarious state actors claiming that because their 
country is digitally successful, it is also well 
governed. Such claims can be supported by arbitrary 
selections of benchmarks to create an ambiguous and 
partitioned picture of the reality.  
This paper provides a path to addressing both 
problems. First, the identified problems are expressed 
through qualitative statements and mapped into 
numbers and correlations. Second, a single synthetic 
indicator is built to measure digital government by 
integrating relevant NRI indicators. This step applies 
factor analysis to identify two uncorrelated 
dimensions of digital government and construct one 
synthetic indicator using those dimensions. Third, we 
integrate this new measure with WGI variables that 
represent analog governance. Using multidimensional 
linear ordering, this step creates a combined indicator 
that expresses progress on both (digital and analog) 
sides of governance. It should be stated that these 
new measures are not new benchmarks in terms of 
frameworks, data collection, etc., but the result of 
calculation carried out upon existing indicators.  
Concerning terminology, we treat “analog” 
governance as synonymous with public governance. 
The term does not have a settled definition [1], e.g. 
[2] associates governance with “structures and 
decision-making processes that allow a state … to 
conduct affairs”, and [3] defines it as “the exercise of 
… authority … to manage a nations affairs”. Here, 
we are interested in those aspects of governance that 
can be associated with state policy and public value 
development [4]. Although we chose not to subscribe 
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 to any particular conceptualization, we treat WGI as a 
conceptual and quantitative basis for representing 
“analog” governance. On the digital side, we adopted 
the conceptualization provided by NRI, and discuss 
the meaning of digital government in Section 2.2.  
This work studies conceptual and practical issues 
that hinder digital government assessment, if treated 
as a subject connected to traditional governance, in 
contrast to existing measurements that consider this 
subject in isolation, disconnected from its “analog” 
foundations. Hence this work targets the needs of: 1) 
policy-makers searching for balanced paths to 
government digitalization that improves public 
governance; 2) practitioners seeking reliable and 
versatile methods of measuring digital government; 
and 3) researchers looking for a quantitative grasp of 
digital government studied in a conceptual manner. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 examines digital government benchmarking 
and identifies related problems and conceptual issues. 
Section 3 presents the research problem, and methods 
and tools used to address it. Section 4 describes the 
results achieved, followed by discussion in Section 5. 
Section 6 provides the summary and limitations of 
this work and outlines directions for future work.  
 
2. Background and Problem Formulation 
 
The aim of this section is to present theoretical 
concepts and practical problems associated with 
digital government benchmarking. The outcome 
relies on the literature review, performed on Scopus 
using the search term ("digital government” OR "e-
government" OR “e-governance”) AND ("theory" 
OR “model” OR “framework”) AND ("evaluation" 
OR “benchmark” OR “measurement”), and using the 
snowballing technique. We examined the papers to 
confirm their relevance. Theoretical and practical 
aspects of digital government benchmarking are 
outlined in Section 2.1, and two problems addressed 
– diversity and digital-analog disconnect of existing 
digital government benchmark instruments – are 
covered in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. 
 
2.1. Digital government benchmarking 
 
Benchmarking is a relatively new form of 
activity, [5], dating back to late 1980s, although its 
historical roots can be found much earlier [6]. With 
digital government arriving in early 1990s, and the 
first digital government benchmarking instruments 
appearing in early 2000s, lack of universal consensus 
of what and how should be measured to establish the 
maturity of digital government is unsurprising.  
Various efforts have been underway to equip 
digital government evaluation with solid theoretical 
foundations, e.g. in terms of the “readiness” construct 
[7][8], using “socio-technical models” to underpin 
key design elements of information systems [9], 
structuring the benchmarking activity using Activity 
Theory [10], employing advanced multi-criteria 
decision support models [11], and introducing 
context-driven benchmarking for digital government 
services [12]. The reasons, scope and methods of 
digital government benchmarking were also provided 
as recommendations for practitioners [13].  
The wealth of approaches to digital government 
benchmarking give rise to measurement instruments 
that vary in their goals, examined units, technical 
construction, etc. For instance, [14] lists seven 
instruments that capture country-level data, from 
global studies like the United Nations’ e-Government 
Survey or the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) 
NRI, to local studies such as McKinsey’s study on 
Middle East digital economy; [15] presents a 
collection of benchmarks divided into academic and 
commercial instruments; and [16] introduces indices 
that confirm diversification of available instruments. 
According to [17], various approaches towards the 
methods and goals of measurement are reflected by 
digital strategies of individual countries. 
The literature also includes critique of existing 
benchmarks, taking different positions, covering 
various aspects, proposing different improvements. 
For example, [7] questions the data-gathering 
approach and limited informational value of the UN 
benchmark, [13] points out limitations of benchmarks 
focusing on adoption and use rather than outcomes 
and impact, and [18] uncovers various technical 
limitation of benchmarks including their failure to 
“differentiate between static websites and highly 
integrated and interactive portals”. 
Our study does not focus on the construction of 
yet another benchmarking instrument, but on the 
question of how to effectively use the information 
provided by existing instruments and how to merge 
such information with external information to create 
a new value. This standpoint can be associated with 
various statements from the literature. For instance, 
the statement that “any ranking system needs a final 
single scale” [15] is refuted by the diversity of 
instruments, [19] notices “forgetting citizens’ needs, 
demands or expectations” in the domain of digital 
government, while [20] observes the failure of 
instruments “to capture the expected transformative 
effects of ICT on government”. Hence the central 
premise underlying our study is using existing 
indicators to uncover a consistent message about the 
actual effects that digitalization has on governance.  
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 2.2. Problem 1: Diversity of benchmarks 
 
The benchmarks vary substantially, e.g. in terms 
of their logic. From a practical viewpoint, while some 
specialization is needed when accompanied by 
interpretative care [15], the diversity and mutual 
incoherence of benchmarks is confusing, especially 
to policy makers that expect a clear assessment of 
their digital policies. The following literature-based 
observations explain the causes of such diversity. 
The first cause is the capacity and negotiability of 
the concept itself. Defining digital government as 
government use of digital technology trivializes the 
problem, claiming that harnessing a new facility 
creates a new entity as a matter of course, while 
focusing on two umbrella terms – government and 
digital – leaves room for interpretation. Definitions 
vary in scope – from information to democracy, 
technology – from computers to Internet, and subject 
– from citizens to stakeholders [21]. Over time, 
expectations grow towards transformation rather than 
information or service supply [22]. Technological 
and transformative structure and operation are at the 
core of the concept [23]. Besides such variety, digital 
government is also considered to undergo evolution 
[24]. In summary, the richness of the concept implies 
heterogeneity of its measurement approaches. 
The second is the assumption of benchmark’s 
coherence with its own objectives and framework 
rather than the digital government landscape. This is 
not necessarily negative – [15] associates it with 
targeting “to answer specific and narrow questions”, 
but comes with “tunnel effects” and “risk avoidance” 
due to deep specialization [25]. Similarly, limited 
representation of certain categories draws upon 
“restricted definition of eGovernment” [26]. 
Nonetheless, established international benchmarks 
manifest their goals rather clearly, e.g. with NRI 
grouping numerous indicators into categories. 
Attempts at unifying benchmarks via synthetic 
models [27] or composite indices [28] are also noted. 
 
2.3. Problem 2: Digital-analog disconnect 
 
While varying in focus, logic, etc. the benchmarks 
measure digital government in isolation, not part of 
the traditional “analog” government. However, this 
context is compelling, if not central, for evaluating 
digital efforts. Pure digital benchmarking can be still 
useful, but one should maintain some reserve when 
drawing conclusions on it. Some countries treat high 
positions in digital rankings as a target in itself [5], 
which can be stimulating for digital architects but 
confusing for those who seek reliable assessment of 
digitally-enabled governance in such countries.  
The influence of digitalization on governance is 
expressed in declarations, normative statements and 
even mounted in digital government definitions. UN 
underlines its strategic role in human development 
[29]. OECD points at efficiency improvements, 
enhanced service quality and policy outcomes [30]. 
ITU suggests economic benefits – cost reduction, 
improved management and better procurement [31]. 
Benefits covering social issues, democracy, natural 
resources, education, etc. are also put forward [21]. 
Research literature brings various proofs of the 
transformative potential of digital government for 
better governance [32], transparency and structural 
change [33], civic involvement in democratic reform 
[34], and reshaping democratic governance [35]. 
Expectations are substantiated towards, e.g. citizen 
empowerment [36], support to democracy [37] and 
transformation and accountability [33]. In summary, 
expectations towards “analog” yields of digital 
government are strongly justified, thus assessing the 
“analog” impact of digital government is relevant.  
Various data-based studies were carried out to 
examine the presence and strength of the digital-
analog link. For instance, [38] studied digital-analog 
correlations via relevant measures on both sides, 
confirming conformity in the area of government 
effectiveness and uncovering discrepancy in the area 
of democracy. A link between digital government 
and good governance [39] was also examined, with 
digital technology causing 57% progress in good 
governance indicators [40]. The connection between 
WGI [41] and e-government benefits was 
conceptualized in [42], and confirmed strongly for 
the Balkan states [43] and weakly for Indonesia [44].  
The analog-digital connection was also explored 
in the digital democracy domain. Confronting the 
UN’s e-participation index with measures of actual 
democracy and Internet freedom, [45] concluded the 
failure of the index to deliver consistent results, 
offering elaboration of the e-participation framework 
[46]. A new e-Democracy index was offered to ease 
such dissonance [47]. According to [48], political 
regime and government capacity influence digital 
government. Also, positive impact on government 
effectiveness and civil liberties, but lack of such 
impact on the level of corruption were proven in [49]. 
The review above confirms interest in assessing 
digital government outcomes. Considering measures 
of outcome, most initiatives pay limited attention to 
the effects of digital transformation. For instance, 
NRI [50] measures user satisfaction, but cares little 
about the impact on policy and governance. In our 
view, only a comparison of benchmark’s results with 
indicators external to it can bring a reliable 
assessment of digital government efforts.  
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 3. Methodology 
 
This section presents the approach adopted in this 
paper to address the two identified problems, 
problem 1 in Section 3.1 and problem 2 in Section 
3.2. In each section, the problem is quantified, and a 
matching statistical technique is provided.  
 
3.1. Problem 1: Diversity of benchmarks  
 
Diversity of benchmarks could be regarded as a 
problem of data overflow, if different benchmarks 
raise the level of knowledge about digital government 
or merely create cognitive confusion. And even if the 
informational value is revealed, is this value unique 
or another expression of a more general message?  
To illustrate this issue, we explored the NRI data, 
a comprehensive instrument that takes a broad view 
over digitalization issues, including governance [51]. 
The official dataset [52] contains data collected for 
151 entities, mainly independent states, covering 
several years. In the analysis, we used the data for the 
most recent year, 2016. Among calculated indices we 
identified five that refer to digital government, three 
belonging to the “Government usage” pillar: 8.01) 
Importance of ICT to government vision, 8.02) 
Government Online Service Index, and 8.03) 
Government success in ICT promotion, and two to 
the “Social impacts”: 10.03) ICT use and government 
efficiency and 10.04) E-Participation Index [50]. 
Table 1 describes this set in more detail, along with 
the respective operational labels used in our research.  
Table 1. NRI digital government indicators, source: [52]  
NRI indicator Description Label 
8.01 Importance of ICTs 
to government vision 
To what extent does the government have a clear implementation plan for utilizing ICTs 
to improve your country’s overall competitiveness? [1 = not at all—there is no plan; 7 = 
to a great extent—there is a clear plan] 
D_VISION 
8.02 Government Online 
Service Index 
The Government Online Service Index assesses the quality of government’s delivery of 
online services on a 0-to-1 (best) scale. 
D_SERVICE 
8.03 Government success 
in ICT promotion 
In your country, how successful is the government in promoting the use of ICTs? [1 = 
not successful at all; 7 = extremely successful] 
D_PROMOTION 
10.03 ICT use and 
government efficiency 
In your country, to what extent does the use of ICTs by the government improve the 
quality of government services to the population? [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent] 
D_EFFICIENCY 
10.04 E-Participation 
Index 
The E-Participation Index assesses, on a 0-to-1 (best) scale, the quality, relevance, and 
usefulness of government websites in providing online information and participatory 
tools and services to their citizens. 
D_PARTICIPATION 
 
The indices 8.01, 8.03 and 10.03 are based on the 
WEF’s own surveys while 8.02 and 10.04 are based 
on the UN’s E-Government Survey. The former are 
in the range 1-7 and the latter in the range 0-1. To 
ensure the same scale, we rescaled the UN indicators 
to the 1-7 range. After elimination of rows with 
missing data, 137 individual observations remained.  
The correlation matrix, i.e. correlation coefficient 
value in the scale from negative 1 to positive 1, for 
the five examined variables is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. NRI variables – correlation matrix 
 
 
All pairs are positively correlated, with four pairs 
revealing very strong correlation (above 0.9). This 
confirms the assumption of data redundancy – 
significant parts of the original information is shared 
across variables, and could be expressed with little 
information loss using fewer variables. The desirable 
outcome would be replacing fragmentary measures 
with a one that synthesizes the original information. 
In search of the synthetic indicator, we decided to 
apply the dimensionality reduction technique, i.e. 
replacing a set of variables with a smaller set while 
saving most of the original information [53][54][55]. 
One of common approaches to dimensionality 
reduction are principal component (PCA) and factor 
analysis (FA) [56][57]. To ensure mathematical 
correctness of this approach, we confirmed that the 
PCA/FA assumptions are satisfied for our dataset.  
To build the synthetic indicator, we followed the 
four steps described in [56][57][58]. The first checks 
the correlation of data as only correlated variables 
can benefit from this approach. As observed before, 
the NRI indicators are mostly strongly correlated. 
The second determines how many components 
(factors) extracted with PCA analysis are sufficient. 
We followed formal criteria, e.g. the Kaiser criterion 
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 to retain the factors with eigenvalue bigger or equal 
to 1 [56][57][58]. The third step involves rotating the 
coordinate system axes to reflect original variables on 
the retaining factors in terms of “loadings”. Among 
various algorithms, we chose varimax rotation [59]. 
The fourth step constructs the synthetic indicator on 
the basis of the outcomes of FA, after rotation.  
Given that the total information, i.e. variation, 
from the original dataset is distributed among 
calculated components ordered by their variation 
share [56], this method is likely to determine a small 
number of components to represent the examined 
concept, i.e. digital government according to NRI. 
Hence, despite reducing the number of variables, the 
amount of information is left almost intact. 
We found the approach effective, transparent – 
there are no arbitrary variable weighting assumptions 
or “hidden” algorithms, and relevant – it addresses 
the problem. However, the method has also its 
limitations [56]. Primarily, since the calculation is 
based on historical data, conclusions are applicable to 
a posteriori analysis, but there is no guarantee that the 
validity of such calculations will be preserved in the 
future. While statistical inference may address this 
limitations to some extent, this is beyond this study. 
 
3.2. Problem 2: Digital-analog disconnect 
 
To address lack of substantial digital-analog 
connection, we need a set of indicators to represent 
the performance of “analog” governance. To this end, 
we decided to use the World Bank’s WGI, released 
on the basis of the arguably most comprehensive and 
enduring governance framework. The instrument 
measures six dimensions expressed in composite 
indicators [60]. The official dataset [61] contains data 
collected for over 200 countries captured on a yearly 
basis from 1996 to 2017, measured on a standardized 
scale with the mean 0 and standard deviation 1. To 
make this data comparable with the “digital” dataset, 
we selected the matching 137 observations. Table 2 
describes this set, along with the labels used.  
The digital-analog disconnect problem can be also 
illustrated by means of correlation. The correlation 
matrix between variables belonging to the digital and 
analog datasets is depicted in Figure 2. The figure 
reveals that while some pairs are strongly correlated, 
the correlation is moderate to weak for most pairs. 
For example, the analog voice is poorly reflected by 
any digital indicator. The message is clear: there is no 
justification for extrapolating digital government 
progress with progress in “analog” governance. Thus 
pure digital measures should be treated with caution 
or, as below, should be augmented with analog 
components to yield a more balanced measure. 
To this end, we decided to harness a multivariate 
technique called linear ordering [62]. The technique 
classifies research objects, e.g. countries, in regard to 
some synthetic latent measure that balances the 
relevant aspects expressed by directly measured input 
indicators [62][63]. The result is a one-dimensional 
ranking of development within a certain domain, in 
our case balanced digital-analog governance. 
 
 
Figure 2. NRI vs WGI correlations
Table 2. Worldwide Governance Indicators, source: [61] 
WGI indicator Description Label 
Control  
of Corruption 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
A_CONTROL 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
A_EFFECTIVENESS 
Political Stability and  
Absence of Violence 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism. 
A_STABILITY 
Regulatory Quality Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
A_REGULATION 
Rule of Law Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
A_LAW 
Voice 
and Accountability 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
A_VOICE 
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 A common approach is to determine for each of 
the input variables whether it contributes to the 
phenomenon in a positive, negative or neutral way – 
in our case such contributions should be positive, and 
optionally how significant is the contribution [62]. 
Among existing ordering algorithms [62] we decided 
to use the Ideal Type, which identifies two theoretical 
objects, the best “ideal type” with maximum levels of 
indicators and “anti-ideal type” with minimum levels. 
For each examined object, a synthetic measure is then 
calculated comparing this object’s performance to the 
distance between the ideal and anti-ideal types.  
The key message is that this method allows for 
creating one combined digital-analog indicator, 
where performance on the digital side is balanced by 
performance on the analog side. This construction is 
in line with our key assumption that digital 
government is not in competition with, neither an 
alternative to “traditional” governance.  
The above calculations were performed with MS 
Excel and R, including “psych” library for PCA/FA 
and one of the authors’ own linear ordering program.  
 
4. Findings 
 
This section presents the results achieved by 
means of the approach introduced in Section 3.  
First, we checked the digital variables against the 
PCA/FA assumptions. There was one outlier, United 
Arab Emirates with D_PROMOTION at 6.21. To 
prevent it from distorting the analysis, this case was 
excluded from factor calculations. Given 5 input 
variables, the remaining 136 records were deemed 
sufficient. Measure of the sampling adequacy, based 
on the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test – 0.73 and empirical 
p-value in Bartlett’s test – 3.5e-224 confirmed that 
the dataset was adequate. Hence, we applied the 
synthetic indicator construction algorithm.  
To determine the number of factors, the initial set 
of non-rotated PCA-extracted components was 
calculated. Table 3 shows the components ordered by 
their eigenvalues, i.e. the share of original variance. 
As components 1 and 2 together cover 97% of the 
original information, we decided that the optimal 
target number of factors for further analysis was two. 
 
Table 3. NRI dataset - PCA-extracted components 
 Component number 
1 2 3 4 5 
Eigenvalue 3.84 1.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 
Cumulative  
share of variance 
77%  97% 99% 99% 100% 
 
Table 4, two varimax-rotated factors with normalized 
variable loadings, shows a legible arrangement of the 
factors. The main observation is that vision, 
promotion and efficiency – the NRI’s variables 
measuring citizen perception – are mapped mostly to 
factor 1, with respective loadings of 0.95, 0.96 and 
0.90, while service and participation – the variables 
“borrowed” from the UN E-Government Survey – are 
mostly mapped to factor 2, with respective loadings 
of 0.93 and 0.96. Hence the first factor could be 
identified with “citizen perception”, while the other 
with “measured effectiveness” of digital government. 
Considering factor scorings for countries, obtained by 
summing raw scores [64] and scaling them to 1-7,  
the best factor 1 scores were: United Arab Emirates 
(6.15), Singapore (6.09), Qatar (5.72), and Rwanda 
(5.53), while the best factor 2 scores were: Singapore 
(6.45), Republic of Korea (6.36), United Arab 
Emirates (6.16) and the Netherlands (6.16).  
 
Table 4. Variables and factors after rotation 
Variable 
Loadings on Common 
variance factor 1 factor 2 
D_VISION 0.95 0.26 97% 
D_SERVICE 0.33 0.93 98% 
D_PROMOTION 0.96 0.25 98% 
D_EFFICIENCY 0.90 0.39 96% 
D_PARTICIPATION 0.23 0.96 98% 
Sum of squared loadings: 2.79 2.07 n/a 
Share in whole variance:  56% 41% n/a 
Share in explained variance: 57% 43% n/a 
 
The groupings identified two “composite” indicators, 
the first containing vision (weight 0.95), promotion 
(0.96) and efficiency (0.90), and the second service 
(0.93) and participation (0.96). In line with the 
previous procedure, further calculations resulted in 
the final synthetic indicator’s (D_GOV’s) weights for 
all five variables: vision – 0.20, service – 0.21, 
promotion – 0.20, efficiency – 0.18, and participation 
– 0.22, briefly summarized in Table 5.   
 
Table 5. Weights of the synthetic indicator (D_GOV) 
Variable 
Origi
nal 
loadin
g 
Intermediate  
normalized 
weight (square 
factor loadings 
scaled to unit) 
D_GO
V 
weight 
1st composite (high loadings on factor 1) – 57% variance 
D_VISION 0.95 0.34 0.20 
D_PROMOTION 0.96 0.35 0.20 
D_EFFICIENCY 0.90 0.31 0.18 
2nd composite (high loadings on factor 2) – 43% variance 
D_SERVICE 0.93 0.48 0.21 
D_PARTICIPATION 0.96 0.52 0.22 
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 This way, we obtained statistics-proven weights 
to aggregate the original variables into one synthetic 
measure of digital government – D_GOV. The same 
scale applies, from 1 (worst) to 7 (best).  
Table 6 presents 20 (among 137) best performing 
countries according to D_GOV. The list is topped by 
Asian and particularly Middle Eastern countries. 
Strong presence of well-developed Western countries 
and one South American country – Uruguay – is also 
noted. However, according to the 2016 Democracy 
Index [65], less than half of the top digital performers 
are “full democracies”, with the rest classified as 
“flawed democracies” or “authoritarian regimes”. 
 To balance the digital and analog measures, we 
applied the linear ordering Ideal Type algorithm to 
the variable D_GOV and the attributes of analog 
governance. To represent the latter, we applied six 
dimensions of WGI. Given that one synthetic digital 
indicator was put against six analog indicators, we 
gave D_GOV six times bigger weight. All indicators 
were standardized prior to analysis. The resulting 
measure of balanced digital-analog performance is 
called DA_GOV. For comparability with D_GOV, 
the value of DA_GOV was rescaled from 0-1 to 1-7.  
Table 6 presents 20 (among 137) best performing 
countries according to DA_GOV. The DA_GOV 
ranking is more nuanced that D_GOV. While 
Singapore stays on top, Western democracies such as 
the United Kingdom, United States, Sweden, 
Switzerland, etc. achieved very high positions thanks 
to the solid digital and traditional governance 
performance. Notably, Uruguay is also at the top.  
In two rightmost columns, Table 6 also presents 
the countries with the largest gains and the largest 
losses from considering their analog performance in 
addition to digital performance. Notably, African and 
generally poorer countries experienced the largest 
gains, e.g. Zambia’s advanced by 72 positions. 
Another remarkable change are large gains for former 
socialist countries – Slovenia, Slovakia, Vietnam, 
Serbia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Tajikistan – 
suggesting that improvements in governance may 
overpass digital progress. On the other hand, Asian 
countries experienced the largest losses, e.g. 
Azerbaijan retracted by 59 positions.  
In general, D_GOV and DA_GOV are strongly 
correlated – both Pearson and Spearman coefficients 
equal 0.80. This hints that while individual changes 
are noticeable, the range of analog corrections is not 
dramatic. However, it should be also noticed that 
D_GOV supplies half of the DA_GOV data content, 
thus such accordance is expected.  
To make comparisons more systematic, we 
calculated the averages of D_GOV and DA_GOV 
regarding three country profiles: geographic – based 
on the UN’ classification [66], political – based on 
the Freedom House’s assessment of political rights 
and civil liberties [67], and economic – based on the 
World Bank’s assignments to income groups [68]. 
The outcome is depicted in Table 7.  
Table 6. D_GOV and DA_GOV - 20 best performances, 2016 
No 
Digital ranking Balanced ranking Analog advantage Analog disadvantage 
Country D_GOV Country DA_GOV Country Change Country Change 
1 Singapore 6.26 United Kingdom 6.39 Zambia +72 Azerbaijan -59 
2 United Arab Emirates 6.15 United States 6.28 Trinidad and Tobago +60 Bahrain -50 
3 Republic of Korea 5.89 Singapore 5.91 South Africa +59 Bangladesh -49 
4 Bahrain 5.68 Uruguay 5.86 Slovenia +57 China -48 
5 United Kingdom 5.65 Sweden 5.69 Slovakia +47 Egypt -48 
6 Netherlands 5.65 United Arab Emirates 5.68 Uganda +46 Colombia -47 
7 Japan 5.60 Switzerland 5.32 Swaziland +45 Albania -47 
8 France 5.54 Spain 5.19 Vietnam +44 Armenia -46 
9 Estonia 5.54 Netherlands 5.15 Switzerland +43 Kazakhstan -44 
10 United States 5.52 New Zealand 5.07 Seychelles +38 Ethiopia -40 
11 Qatar 5.42 Norway 5.04 Tanzania +38 Argentina -40 
12 Israel 5.38 Portugal 4.90 Zimbabwe +38 Ecuador -38 
13 New Zealand 5.34 Qatar 4.82 Serbia +37 Kenya -36 
14 Australia 5.30 Sri Lanka 4.71 Ukraine +37 Brazil -30 
15 Canada 5.22 Luxembourg 4.70 Poland +36 Gambia -30 
16 Norway 5.21 Japan 4.67 Paraguay +36 Côte d'Ivoire -29 
17 Malaysia 5.21 Republic of Korea 4.65 Tunisia +33 Bolivia -29 
18 Saudi Arabia 5.20 Slovakia 4.61 Romania +33 Iran -27 
19 Luxembourg 5.18 Vietnam 4.60 Thailand +30 Honduras -26 
20 Uruguay 5.16 Slovenia 4.54 Tajikistan +29 Costa Rica -24 
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 Table 7. D_GOV and DA_GOV – average scores for 
geographical, political and economic groupings 
 
Subset D_GOV DA_GOV 
Geographic 
Africa 3.25 3.16 
Americas 3.81 3.54 
Asia 4.25 3.73 
Europe 4.35 4.17 
Oceania 5.32 4.73 
Political 
Free 4.35 4.13 
Partly free 3.55 3.32 
Not free 3.78 3.32 
Economic  
High income 4.79 4.51 
Upper-middle income 3.79 3.41 
Lower-middle income 3.49 3.24 
Low income 3.01 2.96 
 
On average, the best performing group, both in terms 
of D_GOV and DA_GOV, is Oceania, and the least 
performing group is Low Income countries. While 
the values of DA_GOV are lower than D_GOV in 
each category, the scales differs. Large declines can 
be observed for Asia, Oceania and the countries that 
are “not free”, and small for Africa and Low Income 
countries, coinciding with their low D_GOV scores. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This study contributes to theoretical and practical 
aspects of digital government benchmarking.  
Theoretical considerations lead us to formulate 
three messages. First, the informal consensus that 
existing digital benchmarking can contribute to the 
digital state “metaphor” needs revision. As shown 
here, this contribution is not obvious. Second, a 
practice-oriented domain like digital government 
must rely on contributions from different disciplines. 
In particular, purely digital conceptualizations are 
insufficient to capture the impact of digital 
transformation on the “real” world. Thus digital 
benchmarking should be applied through an external 
lens, particularly political one. Third, digital 
performance is just part of the picture, to be 
“sustainable”, digital benchmarking needs to capture 
the impact of digital transformation, among other 
drivers of change, on the “analog” governance [69].  
Practical considerations confirm the value of 
statistical methods for new modes of benchmarking. 
Problems highlighted in the digital government 
literature can be quantified and suitable statistical 
procedures can be applied to address them. It is not 
necessarily about creating new instruments, even 
fragmented data coming from existing instruments 
can be processed to uncover new insights into the 
outcomes of digitalization. For example, that official 
propaganda placing strong emphasis on digital 
advancement can hide serious deficits in analog 
performance, that digital-analog imbalance shows 
significant variations between groups of countries, or 
that impressive results of the national digitalization 
efforts should be met with some skepticism.  
While we expect that this work will benefit 
theorists and practitioners, the benefits extend to 
policy-makers and -analysts. This study may help 
them discover a path to a clear method of evaluating 
digital strategy performance in relation to intended 
governance outcomes, and make them aware that 
relying on assortments of mutually inconsistent 
instruments may lead to entirely wrong conclusions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper demonstrates that existing approaches 
to digital government benchmarking are not optimal 
and need a solid revision in regard to their theoretical 
foundations and practical usage. We have shown that 
the problems signaled in theoretical studies, such as 
the diversity and digital-analog disconnect of existing 
benchmarks, may be expressed in statistical terms, 
and that established statistical methods exist to help 
build solutions to them. In particular: 1) specialized 
methods help reformulate original benchmark 
information in terms of fewer variables, and 2) it is 
possible to augment digital measures with additional 
analog measures for balancing and verification.  
This research has some limitations. First, a 
limited set of indicators was used from two 
established instruments, spanning one year. A wider 
selection of instruments and time periods could bring 
more insights, e.g. uncover evolutionary trends. 
Second, the statistical methods used come with some 
limitations that were introduced earlier. Third, a clear 
interpretation of the constructed synthetic measures 
may appear challenging. Thus, we treat the results in 
this paper not as a final product for assessing digital 
and analog governance, but: 1) as a proof of concept 
of a method of constructing synthetic and balanced 
benchmarking instruments, and 2) as elaboration and 
testing of a logic approach that could drive further 
efforts towards constructing such instruments. 
Fully applicable synthetic and balanced 
benchmark construction is expected to involve a 
comprehensive approach including thematic analysis, 
wide selection of methods, availability of expert 
opinions, etc. Testing such a construction over time is 
also necessary. We plan to continue this research to 
make synthetic and balanced benchmarking directly 
applicable to digital government theory and practice. 
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